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The construction of New Zealand as a colonial nation was not a 
conscious act or a single design but the result of cumulative actions 
(Moon 2006: 22). It started long before and continued well after the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, and subsequent proclamations of 
sovereignty.1 As Douzinas states:
a space, terrain or collection of people becomes community when this 
space gathers itself in common. By gathering in common, the terrain 
becomes a territory, the collection, collectivity or community, the space 
of relationships, society. A community comes forth as polis, empire or 
state by circumscribing itself in its interiority and demarking its proper 
[essential characteristics] from an outside (2007: 22).
This paper focuses on the period prior to the Treaty of Waitangi 
when the Supreme Court of New South Wales had jurisdiction 
over British subjects living in the ‘Islands of New Zealand’.2 It is 
acknowledged that there were many factors driving the colonial 
endeavour in New Zealand. However it was in this period that the 
raw materials of the colonial state were formed: namely, a people who 
became an imagined community, with an emerging sense of society 
or culture, occupying a bounded and mapped territory. One, perhaps 
unlikely, catalyst for this process was the unstable, partial and largely 
ineffectual jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme Court.
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Traditionally, the jurisdiction of the courts, and especially the 
criminal jurisdiction, is thought of as tied to place and it exercises its 
power on those people who are ‘in place’ and therefore fall within the 
physical jurisdiction.3 Mobile peoples, if they fell under the power of the 
courts, were dealt with as they passed through a jurisdiction; when they 
were in place/in country they were covered by the criminal jurisdiction 
(McSherry and Naylor 2004: 24-8). In this way the bounded territory 
gives form to legal space where a particular set of laws can apply. As 
mobile peoples move outside this bounded territory their prospective 
actions are no longer subject to the laws of the jurisdiction (Seuffert 
2003: 187-8). For example, the jurisdiction of the courts of England 
was constrained by geographical boundaries. If a person entered 
England and committed a crime, English law applied and the English 
criminal court had jurisdiction. The spatial and temporal limits of 
jurisdiction not only demarcate a legal empire, they also embody a 
form of demarcation or naming of who and what can occupy its space 
(Drakopoulou 2007: 33).
For a period in the first half of the 19th century, prior to the signing 
of the Treaty of Waitangi, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales was extended to include British subjects present in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand,4 without asserting physical jurisdiction over 
‘place.’ In the official yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia there 
is a short entry for 1814 for New South Wales that reads:
Australia, previously known as ‘New Holland’ received present name 
on recommendations of Flinders. Creation of Civil Courts. New 
Zealand proclaimed a dependency of New South Wales (Knibbs 1913).
This act of assertion was achieved by public proclamation by 
Macquarie, the Governor of New South Wales, when he declared 
that New Zealand would be a dependency of New South Wales. The 
assertion was probably questionable at law and was later refuted.5 
Despite this unstable foundation and the fact that this status had little 
immediate effect, it did allow Macquarie to appoint a magistrate to 
New Zealand from time to time to deal with law and order. The first 
was Thomas Kendall who was appointed Justice of the Peace on 12 
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November 1814 in order to keep the King’s peace and help preserve ‘the 
quiet rule and government of His Majesty’s people within and without 
the British Settlements at New Zealand’ (Barton 1927: 30). Kendall 
found himself among a small mobile European population that had not 
previously submitted to any authority in New Zealand, other than that 
of Maori from time to time. In addition, his jurisdictional power was 
unclear and he operated without a court or means of enforcement; his 
impact on the non-Maori population was minimal (McNab 1914: 206).
In addition to the appointment of Kendall, the Governor of New 
South Wales had sanctioned the Reverend Samuel Marsden to set up 
a mission station at the Bay of Islands. Despite New Zealand having 
been declared a dependency of New South Wales in 1814, and these 
rudimentary assertions of power, New South Wales could not effectively 
assert jurisdiction over the British subjects in New Zealand let alone 
all the peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand. During this time the non-
Maori population numbered no more than 2000 and consisted of a 
motley bunch of sealers, whalers, missionaries and traders, most of 
whom were mobile people who stayed for periods of time for economic 
gain. The Maori population, on the other hand, was probably at least 
100,000 and outnumbered non-Maoris by something like 50:1 (Pool 
1991: 42-58). As well as outnumbering non-Maoris, Maori operated 
under established stable political structures and commanded superior 
economic and military power (Elder 1932: 119). Although many 
Europeans were dependent on Maori for protection and survival,6 
contact between them was not always amiable and early missionaries, 
for example, described their interaction as being by ‘marked with great 
cruelty and injustice on the one part, great treachery and dishonesty on 
the other, and a revolting bloodthirstiness and strong spirit of revenge 
on both sides’.7
The realisation that unfettered jurisdiction could not be asserted 
was reflected in the 1814 proclamations by Governor Macquarie, 
which prohibited the removal of any Maori from New Zealand 
without express permission of the chief of the territory in which they 
resided. Perhaps more telling of this unease over jurisdiction was the 
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additional requirement of declaring it unlawful for any person to 
disembark in New Zealand without permission of the chiefs, therefore 
acknowledging the limits of jurisdictional power (Sydney Gazette 12 
November 1814: 1). A further requirement was that any permissions 
granted needed to be confirmed in writing by the resident magistrate.8
Governor Macquarie’s proclamation of New Zealand’s status as a 
dependency may have had only limited effect in asserting jurisdiction 
to deal with what was increasingly being seen as a lawless non-Maori 
population (Sydney Monitor 20 November 1837: 4; Sydney Gazette 28 
November 1837: 2). However the proclamation did set the foundation 
for the creation of a legal space and, as Seuffert points out, the assertion 
of jurisdiction facilitated a process of colonisation by creating a space 
(or place) in which colonial law could operate (Seuffert 2007: 102). That 
space was created by an Act of the British Parliament on 19 July 1823, 
the New South Wales Judicature Act 1823. The Act did not confirm the 
contested dependency status of New Zealand but rather made specific 
provision to extend the jurisdictional power of the newly formed New 
South Wales Supreme Court over New Zealand:
And be it further enacted that the said supreme courts in New South 
Wales and Van Diemen’s Land respectively shall and may inquire of 
hear and determine all treasons piracies felonies robberies murders 
conspiracies and other offences of what nature or kind so ever 
committed or that shall be committed upon the sea or in any haven 
river creek or place where the admiral or admirals have power authority 
or jurisdiction or committed or that shall be committed in the islands 
of New Zealand (New South Wales Judicature Act 1823 UK).9
This Act extended a primarily criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales over the British subjects in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. At this time the Supreme Court of New South Wales and Van 
Diemen’s Land was one court located in Sydney with one sitting judge.10 
This meant that any trial would require the accused, witnesses and any 
evidence to be physically transported to Sydney with the costs incurred 
borne either by the parties or by the New South Wales colony. At times 
the court accepted these immense costs for ‘they could not look upon 
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the expense in a case where it was so necessary’.11 However, the colony 
was not always comfortable with the extraordinary costs involved in 
these cases and made its discomfort known (see Lewis v Lambert: 102). 
It also lacked the power to compel witnesses, or sometimes even the 
accused, to come to Sydney (Sydney Herald 3 August 1837: 2).
A further problem for the Court was that once the witnesses were 
in Sydney there was no way to force them to stay and, if there were 
procedural delays, it sometimes meant few or no witnesses were left 
to testify which resulted in more delays or the case being abandoned.12 
With all these problems the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could 
only be partial and largely ineffectual. Yet it continued until New 
Zealand was proclaimed a colony separate from New South Wales.
The steps toward asserting jurisdiction in New Zealand were 
described as ‘induced by no lust of territorial power, and thirst for 
conquest, but simply by a desire to protect the people from aggression, 
and at the same time to confer public sanction on the proceedings of 
the missionaries’.13 However this paper presents another reading of 
the establishment of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales over the mobile British subjects in New Zealand. It argues that 
the formation of a synthetic jurisdiction, which was a first step in the 
colonial endeavour, would help shape the minds of both the settler 
populations and the British colonial office. This would eventuate 
in the declaration of New Zealand as a colony separate from New 
South Wales and the founding of an organic jurisdiction with the 
establishment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in December 
1841 (NZLR 1938: 233).
Synthetic and Organic Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction creates a space for law to become manifest. This is not 
a mystical creation but a space where power and authority can be 
concentrated in order to speak in the name of the law, order the lives of 
those who are subject to the law and determine the treatment of those 
who step outside the jurisdictional order (Dorsett and McVeigh 2007: 
3-4). Richard Ford provides a useful explication of understandings 
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about jurisdictions by using a dialogical opposition of organic/authentic 
and synthetic/convenient jurisdiction (Ford 1999).
Organic jurisdictions emerge naturally out of circumstances that 
often combine economic and cultural foundations, appearing as an 
outgrowth of principles of law or natural facts. An organic jurisdiction 
contains a relationship between the territory and the people, where 
the people are seen as ‘in place’. Such jurisdictions have a semblance 
of inevitability, a natural quality and are thought to define a cohesive 
entity with united and unique interests (Ford 1999: 859-60). The 19th 
century idea of the nation state is based in organic jurisdiction where the 
assumption is that a pre-political group naturally emerges as a matter 
of right under a sovereign jurisdiction. Whereas organic jurisdictions 
appear natural, synthetic jurisdictions are created for the convenience 
of the specific institutions they serve.
Synthetic jurisdictions do not define a pre-political group but are 
imposed on a group of people from outside. In this way the extension 
of the jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme Court was a 
synthetic jurisdiction imposed by the British Parliament upon a group 
of people (British subjects in Aotearoa/New Zealand) through the 
use of the New South Wales Supreme Court. New South Wales, a 
synthetic jurisdiction emerging in the British imaginary as an organic 
jurisdiction, was also seen as part of the larger British imperial 
jurisdiction and, therefore, could facilitate the imposition of British 
law on the British subject (Ford 1999: 865).14
In a synthetic jurisdiction the individual is the primary agent of 
political life and the territory, the ‘Islands of New Zealand’, serves 
strictly an instrumental purpose; in this way a British subject could 
be selected and authority applied. As Ford states, ‘the synthetic 
jurisdiction is fungible. Its occupants are mobile, rootless rational profit 
maximisers’ (1999: 861). This was clearly true of the group of sealers, 
whalers, traders, escaped convicts and even missionaries in Aotearoa/
New Zealand during this period (Sinclair 1987: 54; Gill 1967; Lovell-
Smith 2009; Cawthorn 2000: 3-9).
The case of Lewis v Lambert illustrates how a synthetic jurisdiction 
215
Spectre of Jurisdiction
encourages people to understand themselves as rational utility 
maximisers. Lewis signed on as an able seaman on the whaling ship, 
Cape Packet, bound for a ‘whaling adventure in the South Seas’ around 
the coast of Aotearoa/New Zealand (84). As was common, alcohol 
formed part of the whalers’ remuneration and Lewis and others decided 
to save their ‘grog’ rations for Christmas Day. A drunken episode ensued 
where Lewis struck the Captain and, as a result, he and a number of 
other seamen were locked up. On their release they were denied their 
alcohol rations and so Lewis refused to work as he was not receiving his 
full remuneration. The captain of the Cape Packet sought redress from 
the British resident magistrate, James Busby, who was situated at the 
Bay of Islands (84). Busby, directed the captain and Lewis to the a naval 
ship, Alligator, which was in New Zealand waters for the ‘protection 
of British Shipping and trade’ and was heading back to Sydney (102).
After an initial refusal the captain of the Alligator, Lambert, agreed 
to transport Lewis back to Sydney in the brig, which took six weeks.15 
On appearing in the Supreme Court, Lewis was charged with ‘behaving 
in a violent, mutinous and disorderly manner dangerous to the peace 
of the crew and to the safety of the said vessel’ (73). On the facts the 
law was clear, there was no cause of action against Lewis unless the 
captain of the Cape Packet took a civil claim himself and he was not 
before the court. The mutiny charge was discharged (85).16
Not satisfied with this, Lewis continued to exercise his agency as 
a rational profit maximiser and sought to recover his loss of earnings 
as well as other damages; he counter charged with a claim of trespass, 
assault and false imprisonment against the captain of the Alligator. After 
numerous petitions from Lewis’s attorney the court gave a reluctant 
decision some six months after the trial (102).
The delay in giving the decision of the Court has not arisen out of 
any difficulty in the case, or doubt on the minds of the judges, but 
from reluctance to give a decision which may produce some degree of 
public mischief (103).
The case was problematic for the Supreme Court because it had no 
choice but to rule in favour of Lewis even though it could have had an 
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impact on commercial and shipping interests in the colony and also 
Europe (94). In its distaste with Lewis,17 however, it awarded nominal 
damages of one farthing only which would not have covered Lewis’s 
costs associated with the trial (Australian 25 September 1835: 2).
As Ford points out, these distinctions between organic and 
synthetic jurisdictions are not a description of an objective reality, 
or even fixed, but operate as a guide to our perceptions and actions, 
or as epistemological filters (Ford 1999: 862). Therefore a synthetic 
jurisdiction once established can over time be transformed into an 
organic jurisdiction.
Spectre of Jurisdiction
During this period Maori were viewed by the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales and the Colonial Office as the peoples of these 
islands and akin to an independent nation with its own jurisdiction.18 
The Colonial Office and court judgments tended to gloss over the 
complex interconnectedness and differences between iwi and hapu 
groups, however, and described Maori as an amorphous whole (Walter 
et al 2006: 274-90). The Colonial Office recognised its tenuous 
jurisdiction in Aotearoa/New Zealand and questioned the legality of 
any magistrate’s authority. In a dispatch to the Governor of New South 
Wales, Viscount Goderich, the Colonial Secretary, noted:
If the natives of New Zealand had … any established system of 
Jurisprudence among them, however rude, their own Courts would 
claim and be entitled to the cognizance of all crimes committed within 
their territory.19
The court also acknowledged that its jurisdiction did not extend to 
Maori and characterised Maori as having their own rules and customs 
and even legitimate rules of warfare with which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court could not interfere.20 This set up a dual jurisdictional 
space; at the centre of this space was a large unknowable Maori 
jurisdiction which Kendall saw as ordered, settled and containing a 
pattern of legal rules.21 Maori themselves seemed to have a clear sense of 
these jurisdictional distinctions, bringing Europeans who had offended 
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their tikanga or committed a hara to the magistrate to be dealt with 
under British rules (Elder: 1932: 119).
The dual jurisdictions of Maori and the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales created uncertainty, however, and helped create a real 
and imagined ‘ jurisdictional no-man’s land, ‘a place where ‘bad 
characters may [reside in]’, where uncertainty may render them safe 
from interference (Dorsett 2007: 140). This no-man’s land and the 
associated uncertainty created an ongoing justification for the extension 
of jurisdiction.
To some extent jurisdictional ‘coverture’22 was chosen especially 
for voluntary mobile peoples because most if not all of the non-Maori 
population moved with ease from one jurisdictional space to another 
(Ford 1999: 844-5; Sydney Herald 3 August 1837).23 However it would 
be untrue to say that jurisdictional ‘coverture’ was freely chosen and 
this was evident in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Even if the court deemed 
the accused a British subject, it may or may not choose to assert its 
jurisdiction (Sydney Herald 5 March 1832: 3). In this way the jurisdiction 
of the New South Wales Supreme Court could be seen as a haunting 
whose presence could be felt (and sometimes violently so), but it was 
hard to define or even know when the spectre of jurisdiction would 
arise (Hutchings 2001: 20-1). Haunting causes unease as one cannot 
determine the interaction and cannot see the cause of one’s unease, but 
organised and systemic structures that are unseen and removed make 
their impact felt in everyday life (Gordon 1997: 19, 135).
While the Supreme Court of New South Wales was reluctant to 
expand its jurisdiction and would interpret the jurisdictional clause 
narrowly at times to exclude certain offences (MacKay v David, R v 
M’Dowall), in other cases it would expand its jurisdiction and even 
amend the charges to facilitate conviction (R v Doyle, R v Hackett, 
Foley, Donoghue, Kanes and Sweeny). While this variable permeability 
of the jurisdiction increased what Gordon referred to as unease, it also 
helped increase awareness of the presence of the jurisdiction of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court.
The spectral nature of this jurisdiction was understood by some of 
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the convicted, and this was highlighted in the case of R v Doyle. Doyle 
was charged with attempted murder and aggravated robbery from the 
dwelling house of Mr John Wright (a British subject) in the Bay of 
Islands (Australian 4 August 1837: 2). Doyle pleaded not guilty but also 
attempted an argument that went to the very nature of this incomplete 
jurisdiction. Doyle argued that the Court’s jurisdiction rightly extended 
only to the British subject. His defence narrative continued that because 
he was born in New Bedford, America, he was not a British subject. 
If the Court was not satisfied that he was a British subject then the 
spectral nature of its jurisdiction meant he must pass through (Sydney 
Herald 6 November 1837: 6). This would have effectively meant the 
Court could not prosecute the case as they would not have jurisdiction 
over an American. It appears the court ignored Doyle’s extraterritorial 
claims of citizenship or imbued Doyle with British subject status due 
to his being ‘late of Sydney’, thereby silencing his chosen narrative 
even though it seems his sojourn had been only transitory. Doyle was 
sentenced to death (Sydney Herald 6 November 1837:6).
R v Doyle emphasises the spectral nature of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Doyle’s plausible jurisdictional arguments 
should have exorcised or at least tested the jurisdiction of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court but it ignored this challenge and applied 
its jurisdiction anyway.
Creating a Sense of Community
A precursor to the creation of an organic jurisdiction is the sense of 
community, the pre-political group that will naturally form the subjects 
of the organic jurisdiction. The colonial project was a challenge to these 
representations because the colonial settlers were transplanted from a 
foreign nation state with no natural convergence of people, culture and 
territory. This was especially true in the early part of the 19th century in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand where the non-Maori were mobile, both within 
and outside the bounded territory, and therefore not particularly tied 
to the place. In Aotearoa/New Zealand there was an existing people, 
Maori, who naturally brought together the convergence of people, 
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culture and territory, although they were diverse peoples, or iwi, who 
were textually united by indirect reference in the phrase ‘Islands of 
New Zealand’ in the 1823 legislation.
Non-Maori peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand during the 1820-
40s were diverse and, although the most significant groups were the 
Americans, French and British, they included Portuguese, Dutch, 
Canadian, German and Danish (Belich 2007: 137-9). Crews on many 
of the whaling ships were also often multicultural and multinational 
(including Maori) (Cawthorn 2000: 3-6). As Doyle’s case suggests, 
however, the assertion of jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme 
Court emphasised homogenous aspects of the non-Maori community 
and, by ignoring the diversity within it, allowed the differences to 
become invisible.
The synthetic jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme Court 
could only embrace the British subject or, as Doyle demonstrates, those 
who were deemed to be British subjects, in effect actual or judicially 
imagined British subjects. In this way the jurisdiction operated to create 
an imagined homogenous British community that would be the focus 
of the media, New South Wales Supreme Court and officials of the 
British Colonial Office. The creation of a sense of distinctiveness and 
relative homogeneity supported the foundation ideology of the nation 
state and would eventually support the transition from synthetic to 
organic jurisdiction (Ford 1999: 853, 859-60).
A synthetic jurisdiction, especially when created to administer 
a restrictive law (in this case criminal and partial civil jurisdiction), 
helps create a sense of community. The sense of community is then 
strengthened as the law touches the lives of: the victims of an offence 
who are able to avail themselves of the courts; individuals desiring to 
regularise economic exchange with the back-up of the law: and those 
who are convicted. In Aotearoa/New Zealand the creation of British 
community was also facilitated by the reporting of cases in newspapers 
in which the main content was advertising, court news or official 
announcements.
Because there were no law reports for the Supreme Court, 
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newspapers operated as the official record and Supreme Court cases 
were reported in The Australian, The Sydney Gazette, The Sydney Herald as 
well as other newspapers that were widely available (if not immediately) 
in New Zealand (Rice 1992: 130; Coupland 1892: 76-7; Pybus 1954: 
63-4). Every case was reported because the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales alone had jurisdiction in New Zealand, even in those 
cases where it refused to assert its jurisdiction (R v M’Dowall, Ex parte 
McKey). This contributed to an impression that the frequency, authority 
and power of the jurisdiction were far greater than the reality.24
The media provided a shared understanding, even between 
geographically isolated people, by providing a place for social 
interaction. Not only were the British living in New Zealand consumers 
of the media, they were also active contributors to it through letters.25 
This created an even stronger iterative and self-confirming process 
which helped form and strengthen the imagined community of British 
living in New Zealand even though they numbered less than 2000 
British inhabitants living in pockets around Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
The New Zealand contributors to the papers were almost always British, 
the Supreme Court cases arising from New Zealand only focused on 
the British subject, and the stories and official notices focused on British 
interests or threats to those interests. In this way the constructions of 
the world sustained patterns of social interaction and excluded others, 
further consolidating the imagined British community (Burr 1995: 2-5).
One repeated threat described in the papers was the lawless 
uncivilised European who was not only a danger to the emerging 
British community but also to Maori.26 The media helped construct 
the sense that both were at risk from certain criminal behaviours and 
lawlessness and this was seen as justifying an increase in legalisation 
and enforcement procedures more akin to those in Britain. This 
led to the appointment of James Busby as British Resident and the 
establishment of a police cell in Kerikeri in 1832. The appointment was 
justified with a view to ‘protecting British commerce’ and to ‘repress 
the outrages, which unhappily British Subjects are found so often to 
perpetrate against the persons and property of the Natives and the 
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peace of Society in those Regions’.27 Maori were not constructed as 
a threat to this emerging community but rather as fellow victims of 
the lawless ruffian and escaped convicts (R v Doyle, R v Flanagan, R v 
Walton et al). The reiterated stories in the media created a spectre-like 
other that fascinated and revolted non-Maori and gave an uneasy sense 
that these were reflections of oneself ‘derailed and gone terribly wrong’ 
(Hutchings 2001: 54).
The unease created by this jurisdictional haunting and spectre of 
the lawless European was a powerful consolidating source, and this 
was not lost on the officials or the Colonial Office. In December 1837, 
following the conviction and execution of Edward Doyle, a notice was 
placed in the Colonist to address any belief that difficulty in prosecution 
and conviction would ‘ensure immunity’:
His Excellency trust that this example will afford a salutary warning 
to all persons who may be disposed to commit similar acts, and by 
convincing them that, however remote, they are not beyond the reach 
of justice, will render such outrages less frequent in the future (Colonist 
14 December 1837: 6)
In this way Doyle was used as an example of the lawless European 
that posed a continual threat, against which the community could 
bond in opposition, and justify calls for increased colonial protection.
This sense of community grew, so that by the late 1830s the 
mobile peoples were being joined by more permanent settlers (Owens 
1981). Even though the assertion of jurisdiction in many ways was a 
concentrating of a colonial driving force from England through the 
jurisdiction of the New South Wales colony,28 the reporting of the 
cases in the various New South Wales newspapers strengthened the 
spectre of jurisdiction. The continual reporting of the cases created the 
semblance of corporal substance to the jurisdiction of the New South 
Wales Supreme Court for both the colonists in New South Wales, 
and the mobile non-Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This cross-
territorial sense of imagined community was further strengthened 
by the regular ships travelling between Sydney and Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, transporting news and people.29
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The concept of a British community in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
was not confined to non-Maori. In October 1831 a gathering of 13 
regional chiefs and their missionary advisors was held in Kerikeri, with 
the purpose of composing a letter to the King of England. William 
Yeats of the Committee of Missionaries sent the original letter and his 
translation and gloss to England which appeared to ask the Imperial 
Government for protection from the French and ‘troublesome’ settlers 
or escapees (Henare 2007: 117). However Henare’s discussion of the 
original Maori text has a quite different emphasis, requesting Britain 
to be an ally against foreign aggression and, importantly, recognising 
the jurisdictional community by requesting that Britain deal with 
transgressions quickly or else Maori jurisdiction would righteously be 
applied. The Maori version of the letter recognises the presence of other 
groups in Aotearoa/New Zealand but consciously selects the British 
community to ‘be friend and ally’ (Henare 2007: 117).
The spectral nature of the New South Wales Supreme Court and 
the media were both forces in the creation of the pre-political British 
community necessary for the formation of organic jurisdiction (Ford 
1999: 860).
Mapping the ‘Islands of New Zealand’
The transformation or development of synthetic jurisdiction into 
organic jurisdiction requires more than the pre-political community 
— the community needs to be in place with a circumscribed territory. 
By 1823, New Zealand already had a long history as a ‘place’ in the 
European imagination. Some form of amorphous New Zealand, under 
various spellings, had appeared on maps across Europe from 1644 
onwards (Hooker 2004: 41-2). By 1769 Cook had fairly accurately 
mapped the entire coastline, thus creating a bounded space that could 
be filled with the simple proclamation of jurisdiction (Dorsett 2007: 
146). As Ford points out, jurisdiction is territorially defined and the 
geographic boundaries are a ‘bright line rule’ that is not flexible (1999: 
853). 30 Indeed the synthetic jurisdiction covering New Zealand was 
territorially based in both the words ‘Islands of New Zealand’, in 
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the New South Wales Judicature Act 1823, and in the maps that 
circumscribed its boundaries.
The words ‘Islands of New Zealand’ gained meaning in the 
European imagination as a result of the mapping. Maps are not neutral. 
They are selective in content and represent ways to conceive, articulate 
and structure the human world, in this case a European world. The 
map serves as a symbolic statement of power and dominion (Blomley 
1994:83). As Dorsett explains, the techniques of mapping facilitate the 
abstraction of territory from the physical earth and allow the concept 
of territory to act as a mediator between sovereignty/jurisdiction and 
the physical (2007 149). New Zealand, as a number of islands, was 
defined by a coast, which avoided some of the problems of defining 
its external borders.
Abstracted and mapped, New Zealand could be seen in the British 
imaginary as a bounded territory awaiting colonisation. However, 
the physical and social reality was very different: right up until 1840 
the Colonial Office was reluctant to colonise New Zealand and 
also reluctant to invest in the further development of this ghostlike 
jurisdiction (Seuffert 2007: 105; Orange 2010). This was in part due 
to the dominant position of Maori, its vast distance from England, 
and the increasing costs of maintaining the existing colonies and the 
American secession (Hight 1914: 46).
Conclusion
By the late 1830s New Zealand was ripe for the colonial harvest and was 
being watched with interest by the Americans who had appointed James 
Clendon as Consul to New Zealand in 1839 (Wasserman 1949). The 
French also were sending increasing numbers of ships and concerns were 
escalating as to their motives with respect to colonisation (Williams 
1941: 25-8). A sense of community, created through the assertion of 
the somewhat incomplete jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, had been strengthened by the homogenising influence 
of the spectral nature of the jurisdiction. This fiction of sameness 
and uniformity, as well as New Zealand’s well-mapped geographical 
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boundary and bounded territory, were essential to the pre-political and 
cultural formation required to create an organic jurisdiction.
New Zealand in the late 1830s had the necessary elements for 
the creation of an organic jurisdiction: a pre-political community, 
imagined as sharing similar goals and culture — the British subject 
and a bounded mapped territory. The difficulty from the perspective of 
the colonisers was that Maori had the economic, demographic, political 
and cultural upper hand. Just as the extension of the New South Wales 
jurisdiction had been justified in terms of the protection of Maori from 
the lawless European, so too the adoption of the Treaty of Waitangi 
was justified in terms of protection of Maori from the anarchic growing 
settler population: law within an organic jurisdiction was required to 
remain civilised.
Despite the reluctance of the Colonial Office, the fiction of an 
organic jurisdiction would emerge on 21 May 1840. Lieutenant-
Governor Hobson issued two Proclamations of British sovereignty over 
both the North and South Islands and approval was granted by the 
Colonial Office in The London Gazette on the 2 October 1840.31 This 
fiction would coalesce into what Seuffert refers to as New Zealand’s 
dominant founding story that facilitated its emergence as a modern 
nation (2007: 105).
Although the jurisdiction of the New South Wales Supreme 
Court remained in theory after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
in practice no more cases were heard; rather than an exorcism of the 
spectral jurisdiction, it just faded away, and was replaced in December 
1841 with the creation of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The 
legal connection with New South Wales was severed by an Ordinance 
passed on 15 March 1842 which repealed all New South Wales laws 
and ordinances in force in the Colony of New Zealand which ‘shall 
thereafter have no force or effect whatever within the Colony’, thereby 
completing (at least externally) the organic jurisdiction (NZLJ 1938: 
234).
Internal jurisdiction would take another 37 years to undermine and 
extinguish the dual jurisdictional nature of Aotearoa/New Zealand and 
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replace it with the certain jurisdictional boundaries of New Zealand 
(Seuffert 2007). This assertion of internal jurisdiction was intrinsically 
linked with the assumption of sovereignty and the construction of a 
national identity, albeit a unitary Austinian conception of sovereignty 
(Rumbles 1998: 32-40). The 19th century British conception of law 
operated in a jurisdiction, with the law being both the expression 
and the tools of sovereignty. This meant that the expansion of the 
colonial jurisdiction needed to fill the ‘Islands of New Zealand’. In 
the light of this conception of sovereignty, any accommodation of a 
dual jurisdiction could only be temporary. It was the expansion of the 
jurisdiction, especially throughout the 1860s, that began the process 
that would extend the hegemonic control of the law over Maori,32 
effecting what Blomley refers to as the closure of law (1994: 8-26). This 
delegitimisation of non-Western polities was crucial in structuring 
conventional routes towards colonial domination and was not unique 
to New Zealand (Strang 1996: 25).
Although Hobson’s proclamation asserted that 21 May 1840 was 
the date that full sovereignty was vested in the British Crown,33 this 
date is neither the beginning nor the end of a process of assertion 
of sovereignty. The seeds of sovereignty had already been sown in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand over the preceding 17 years, resulting in a 
community, territory and jurisdiction that could be eventually filled 
with the idea of a New Zealand nation (Moon 2006: 217-18). The 
expansion of jurisdiction by the New South Wales Supreme Court was 
a step along this path of bringing together a people, place and culture 
and, eventually, displacing a people, place and culture.
Notes
1 London Gazette No. 19900: 2179-80 http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/
issues/19900/pages/2179
2 New South Wales Judicature Act 1823 (UK)
3 For example, in the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), ss5, 6 &7 create the ‘in place’ 
jurisdiction of the New Zealand criminal law — although this has been 
extended in certain circumstances, for example, sexual conduct with 
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children outside New Zealand (ss144A-144C — introduced 1995) and 
the application the cybercrime sections (ss249-252 — introduced 2003).
4 I use Aotearoa/New Zealand when referring to the dual jurisdictional space 
of Maori and the New South Wales Supreme Court; and Aotearoa when 
referring to the jurisdictional space solely occupied by Maori and likewise 
New Zealand when referring to some form of sole British jurisdiction.
5 ‘Kendall, Thomas’ from An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, edited by A 
H McLintock, originally published in 1966.Te Ara: The Encyclopaedia
 of New Zealand Updated 22 April 2009 URL: http://www.TeAra.govt.
nz/en/1966/kendall-thomas/1 See also Chief Justice Dame Sian Elias 
2002 Justices’ Quarterly 71/2: 2. It was in 1840 that New Zealand legally 
became a dependency of New South Wales and this was only for a few
 months (Cramp 1914: 3-7).
6 ‘Letter from Reverend Samuel Marsden to the Colonial Secretary’ 3 March 
1817 in Elder 1932: 224.
7 Author unknown ‘An Epitome of the Early History of New Zealand’ in 
MacKay 1873 1: 2 (doc 1). See also evidence of William Yates in Report 
from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) Minutes of 
Evidence 1836: 188.
8 It is unlikely that this had much effect either on Maori being carried off or 
requests to Maori before landing. See Sydney Gazette 12 November 1814 
in Vol 12: 571.
9 This was re-enacted in 1828 in the New South Wales Judicature Act 1828.
10 Sir Francis Forbes was appointed the first Chief Justice in 1823 and sat as 
sole judge. In 1825 he was joined by John Stephen, and in 1827 by James 
Dowling. Even with this increase in the number of judges the bench 
struggled to cope with its workload in Sydney. See Sir Francis Forbes 
<http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/
SCO_sirforbes>
11 ‘Those in authority in this Colony would have failed in their duly had they 
spared any trouble or expense in bringing this case home to the prisoner; 
the Court had reason to know that the expenses on the case had been 
immense, but they could not look upon the expense in a case where it was 
so necessary.’ R v Doyle (Sydney Herald 20 November 1837: 6).
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12 In a charge of murder against Stewart, by the time the case came to trial 
the witnesses had left NSW: all Stewart’s co-accused had fled the colony 
while on bail, leaving only Stewart to stand trial. Eventually Stewart 
himself left the colony and the case was abandoned (R v Stewart 31-66).
13 Author unknown ‘An Epitome of the Early History of New Zealand’ in 
MacKay 1873 1: 2 (doc 1).
14 The Supreme Court of New South Wales itself was only formed in 
1823 under Chief Justice Forbes who commented: ‘The laws of England 
are essentially the laws of New South Wales, that the Government is 
essentially an English Government; and that the courts are essentially the 
courts at Westminster.’ <http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_
court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_sprcrt_hist1>
15 The captain of the Alligator was persuaded to take Lewis back to Sydney 
in order to ensure the safety of the vessel (Cape Packet), ‘that if the [Lewis] 
had not been taken out of the vessel, [the Cape Packet] must have returned 
without cargo to  Sydney  to the complete loss of the voyage’ (Lewis v 
Lambert [1835] NSWSC 73: 85). This was clearly in line with the Alligator’s 
mission to protect ‘British Shipping and trade’ (102).
16 The case report gives clear instruction on how Lewis (and other seaman) 
could have been liable, and gives a guide to the legal limits of violence 
aboard economic shipping including the legal use of irons, flogging and 
imprisonment aboard their own ship through contractual authority 
between master and mariner. However once Lewis was handed over to the 
other ship the Captain’s contractual authority (or domestic jurisdiction) 
was also gone. See Dowling 1835: 82-102.
17 The court referred to Lewis’s claim as frivolous and damnum abseque injuria, 
(damages without injury) and his conduct as so ‘mutinous and disorderly 
that the Master might have brought him in irons to this port [Sydney]’.
18 It has been argued that this continued to be the basis on which the Colonial 
Office and Hobson approached the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Kingsbury 1989, McHugh 1989)
19 Goderich (Colonial Secretary) to the new Governor of New South Wales 
Governor Bourke, 31 January 1832, in Historical Records of Australia Series 
1, Vol 16: 512.
20 See R v Stewart [1831] NSWSC 31 and Goderich’s discussion of Moore’s 
argument in Historical Records of Australia Series 1, Vol 16: 512
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21 ‘Missionaries’ Replies to Mr. Bigge’s Queries’ attached to ‘Thomas Kendall 
to Commissioner Bigge’ 8 November 1819 in McNab 1908: 442.
22 The word ‘coverture’ is used in the sense that mobile peoples are under the 
authority of jurisdiction whether they choose to submit or not.
23 This is illustrated in the case of Doyle where he describes being born in 
America, moving to South Sea Islands, then Sydney and finally New 
Zealand.
24 Similar to the reporting of violent crime today see Sacco1995: 141-54.
25 For example see The Sydney Gazette 17 November 1832: 3.
26 See evidence of William Yates for examples in the Report from the Select 
Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) Minutes of Evidence 1836.
27 Goderich Governor Bourke 2 May 1832 Historical Records of Australia, 
Series 1, Vol.16: 662
28 See Goderich to Governor Bourke, 22 May 1833 in Historical Records of 
Australia, Series 1, Vol.16: 662:510:51.3
29 See weekly ‘Shipping Intelligence’ in the Sydney Herald 1831- 1842.
30 Ford explains that this territorial rule is vital for the organic jurisdiction 
the “organic conception posits an organic relationship between such groups 
and the territory they occupy It is not simply that the groups themselves 
are of primary importance , but also that the groups’ identities depend 
on their control over a particular territory, a significant and culturally 
encumbered place” (1999: 860)
31 The London Gazette No. 19900: 2179-2180 http://www.london-gazette.
co.uk/issues/19900/pages/2179.
32 See for example Native Land Court Act 1862 and 1865, New Zealand 
Settlements Act 1863, Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863.
33 The London Gazette No. 19900: 2179-2180 http://www.london-gazette.
co.uk/issues/19900/pages/2179.
References
Author unknown 1938 ‘The Supreme Court and Court of Appeal: The First 
Beginnings’ New Zealand Law Journal 14: 233-6
Barton R 1927 Earliest New Zealand: The Journals and Correspondence of the 
Rev. John Butler Palamontain and Petherick Masterton
229
Spectre of Jurisdiction
Binney J ed 2007 Kerikeri 1770-1850: The Meeting Pool Bridget Williams 
Books Wellington
Ballantyne T and A Burton eds 2009 Moving Subjects: Gender, Mobility, and 
Intimacy in an Age of Global Empire University of Illinois Press Illinois
Belich J 2007 Making Peoples Penguin Wellington
Biersteker T and C Weber eds 1996 State Sovereignty as Social Contract 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge
Castle T and Kercher B eds 2005  Dowling’s Select Cases 1828-1844  The Francis 
Forbes Society for  Australian Legal History Sydney
Coupland R ed 1892 Typo: A Monthly Newspaper and Literary Review 6/70
Cawthorn M 2000 Maori, Whales and Whaling an Ongoing Relationship 
Department of Conservation Wellington
Cramp K R 1914 The State and Federal Constitutions of Australia Angus and 
Robertson Sydney (2nd edn)
Dorsett S 2007 ‘Mapping Territories’ in McVeigh 2007: 137-58
Dorsett S and S McVeigh 2007 ‘Questions of Jurisdiction’ in McVeigh 2007: 
3-19
Douzinasm Costas 2007 ‘The Metaphysics of Jurisdiction’ in McVeigh 2007: 
21-32
Elder J ed 1932 The Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden Coulls Somerville 
Wilkie Ltd and A H Reed Dunedin
Ford R 1999 ‘Laws Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)’ Michigan Law 
Review 97: 843-930
Gill J 1967 ‘Notes on the Sealing Industry of Early Australia’ Journal of the 
Proceedings of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland 8/2: 218-45
Gordon A 1997 Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination 
University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis
Henare M 2007 ‘The Maori Leaders Assembly, Koroipo Pa 1831’ in Binney 
2007: 112-18
Haines D 2009 ‘ In Search of the ‘Waheen’: Ngi Tahu Women, Shore Whalers 
and the Meaning of Sex in Early New Zealand’ in Ballantyne et al 2009: 
49-66
Hight J and H Bamford 1914 The Constitutional History and Law of New 
Zealand Whitcombe and Tombs Christchurch
230
Rumbles
Hooker B 2004 Finding New Zealand DelZur Research Orewa
Hutchings P 2001 The Criminal Spectre in Law, Literature and Aesthetics: 
Incriminating Subjects Routledge London
Kawharu I H ed 1989 Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives on the Treaty of 
Waitangi Oxford University Press Auckland
Kingsbury B 1989 ‘The Treaty of Waitangi: Some International Law Aspects’ 
in Kawharu 1989: 121-57
Knibbs G H 1913 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1912 
The Bureau of Census and Statistics Melbourne
Larner W and P Spoonley 1995 ‘Post-Colonial Politics in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand’ in Staiulis et al 1995: 39-64
Lovell-Smith M 2009 ‘Early Mapping — Traders, Whalers, Missionaries: 1800–
1840’, Te Ara — the Encyclopedia of New Zealand Updated 1 March 2009 
URL: http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/early-mapping/3
MacKay A 1873 A Compendium of Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs 
in the South Island Vol I Government Printer Wellington
— 1873 A Compendium of Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs in the 
South Island Vol II Government Printer Wellington
McHugh P 1989 ‘Constitutional Theory and Maori Claims’ in Kawharu 
1989: 25-63
McNab R 1908 ‘Historical Records of New Zealand’ Vol1 Wellington
— 1914 From Tasman to Marsden: A History of Northern New Zealand from 
1642 to 1818 Wilkie and Company Dunedin
McSherry B and B Naylor 2004 Australian Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives 
Oxford University Press Melbourne
McVeigh Shaun ed 2007 Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction Routledge Cavendish 
New York
Moon P 2006 Fatal Frontiers Penguin Books Auckland
Owens J 1992 New Zealand Before Annexation’ in Rice 1992: 28-53
Orange C 2010 ‘Busby, James — Biography’ Dictionary of New Zealand Biography 
Te Ara — the Encyclopedia of New Zealand Updated 1 September 2010 
URL: http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/1b54/1
Pool I 1991 Te Iwi Māori: A New Zealand Population Past, Present and Projected 
Auckland University Press Auckland
231
Spectre of Jurisdiction
Rice G 1992 The Oxford History of New Zealand Oxford University Press 
Auckland (2nd edn)
Rumbles W 1998 Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: New Relationship or 
New Mask? Unpublished LLM thesis University of Waikato
Sacco V 1995 ‘Media Constructions of Crime’ Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 539: 141-54
Seuffert N 2003 ‘Shaping the Modern Nation: Colonial Marriage Law, 
Polygamy and Concubinage in Aotearoa New Zealand’ Law Text Culture 
7: 186-219
— 2007 ‘Jurisdiction and Nation Building: Tall Tales in Nineteenth-Century 
Aotearoa/New Zealand’ in McVeigh 2007: 102-34
Staiulis D and N Yuval-Davis eds 1995 Unsettling Settler Societies Sage London
Strang D 1996 ‘Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial 
Imperialism’ in Biersteker et al 1996: 22-49
Walter R, Smith I and Jacomb C 2006 ‘ Sedentism, Subsistence and socio-
political organization in prehistoric New Zealand’ World Archaeology 
38/2: 274-90
Wasserman L 1949 Pacific Historical Review 18/3: 363-8
Media
‘Government and General Orders’ Sydney Gazette 12 November 1814: 1
‘New Zealand Extract from a Letter from the Bay of Islands’ Sydney Gazette 
17 November 1832: 3
‘Law Intelligence: Supreme Court: In Banco’ Australian 25 September 1835: 2
‘Law Intelligence: Supreme Court Criminal Side’ Sydney Herald 3 August 
1837: 2
‘Law Intelligence: Supreme Court Criminal Side’ Sydney Herald 6 November 
1837: 6
‘Law Intelligence: Supreme Court Criminal Side’ Sydney Herald 20 November 
1837: 6
‘Law’ Australian 4 August 1837: 2
‘Law Intelligence: Supreme Court Criminal Side’ Sydney Monitor 20 November 
1837: 4
232
Rumbles
‘The Bolting System’ Sydney Gazette 28 November 1837: 2
‘New Zealand’ The Colonist 14 December 1837: 6
Cases
Ex parte McKey (1832) NSW Sel Cas (Dowling) 225
MacKay v David [1832] NSWSC 52
Lewis v Lambert (1835) NSW Sel Cas (Dowling) 225, [1835] NSWSC 73
R v Doyle [1837] NSWSC (1 August 1837)
R v Flanagan et al [1827] NSWKR 1; [1827] NSWSC 8
R v M’Dowall [1827] NSWSC 18
R v Stewart (1831) NSW Sel Cas (Dowling) 302; [1831] NSWSC 31
R v Walton [1827] NSWSC 7
Statutes
New South Wales Judicature Act 1823 (UK)
New South Wales Judicature Act 1828 (UK)
Native Land Court Act 1862 and 1865 (NZ)
New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 (NZ)
Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863 (NZ)
